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1 INTRODUCTION 
Like many other industrialised countries Germany has experienced a powerful 
concentration process in food retailing. There are some issues, however, which 
make Germany a special case in Europe and among industrialised countries in 
general. This holds true in terms of market structure and concentration, market 
development and pricing strategies. The market share of hard discounters like 
Aldi and Lidl has grown continuously in recent decades and the market share of 
discounters in general has reached a magnitude that is well above that found in 
other European countries. This has led to robust price competition in German 
food retailing. Along with this development, it has been very difficult for inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to gain ground in the German food retailing 
industry. One example was the market entry by Wal-Mart which, given its initial 
ambitious goals, was not successful. On the other hand, German hard 
discounters have strongly affected outward FDI by other German food retailers. 
In the process of expanding into other markets abroad, these companies have 
had a positive impact on exporting by the German food industry. 
This article describes and analyses these major trends in German food retailing 
in detail. It is organised as follows. The structure of food retailing is described 
and explained in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the importance of inward and 
outward FDI in German food retailing. It is discussed in both sections how 
increased concentration in food retailing affects the marketing chain. Price 
competition is intense in Germany, and studies of food pricing strategies have 
used scanner data. Therefore a special case study in Section 4 is the analysis 
of food pricing strategies in Germany based on scanner-data evidence. The 
analysis shows that the pricing behaviour of food retailers is characterised by 
the every-day-low-pricing (EDLP) strategies of discounters and the high-low-
pricing (HiLo) strategies of their major competitors. The main elements of 
pricing policies are indicative of firms’ market power: repeated price discounts 
for major food brands, frequent changes of loss leaders, the dominant role of 
psychological pricing, and a strong price rigidity for all other foods which are not 
on special offer. The results are summarised in Section 5. 
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2 STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF FOOD RETAILING IN 
GERMANY 
What are the characteristics and market structure of food retailing in Germany, 
and how did these change over time? Which factors affected structural change? 
These questions are analysed in this section first at the level of store types and 
then at the industry level. 
2.1 Structure and Changes at the Store-type Level 
Structural changes at the store-type level are highlighted in this section. First, it 
is necessary to distinguish between different store types and to define them. 
Hypermarkets constitute the largest store type in Germany. According to A.C. 
Nielsen (2004), these are stores with a sales area of at least 5,000 square 
metres
1
, which provide a broad assortment of food and non-food goods with 
self-service. Consumer markets are stores that have a sales area between 
1,500 and 4,999 square metres. These are followed by supermarkets
2
, which 
are the smallest modern food-retailing stores, with a sales area between 400 
and 1,499 square metres. An important development in food retailing is the role 
played by discounters. A discounter is a store where the discount principle is 
applied irrespective of the size of its sales area. The discount principle is 
characterised by a low-price strategy associated with a limited assortment of 
goods (A.C. Nielsen 2004, p. 13). Typically, the discounters’ range does not 
only consist of fresh or durable food products
3
 but also selected non-food goods 
that are sold on a changing weekly basis. This non-food activity is becoming 
more and more important in generating discounters’ revenues and is a feature 
distinguishing them from other companies. Remaining food stores is a 
classification covering all food stores that have a sales area below 400 square 
metres.  
German discounters are further divided into hard discounters and soft 
discounters. Hard discounters have a reduced product range, like Aldi, Lidl 
and Norma. In contrast, soft discounters traditionally have a larger product mix 
                                            
1
  One square metre corresponds to 10.76 square feet. 
2
  Another common version of store classification distinguishes between small 
consumer markets, ranging between 800 and 1,499 square metres of sales area, and 
supermarkets, with a sales area between 400 and 799 square metres (A.C. Nielsen 
2000). 
3
  Depending on the company, food products may be sold as private labels or as 
branded goods, both mostly having lower prices compared with other store types. 
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and depth (Bundeskartellamt 2005). Therefore, soft discounters are often called 
brand discounters. Examples are individual stores of Tengelmann (Plus), Rewe 
(Penny), Spar (Netto) and Edeka (Diska, Kondi, NP, Treff). More recently, the 
distinction between hard and soft discounters has blurred and it will not be used 
in the following analysis. Today, an increasing number of branded products are 
found in the stores of Lidl and Norma (Twardawa 2006).  
The changes over time in the number of establishments in the various store 
types are presented in Table 1. It has to be borne in mind that German data on 
food retailing include the impacts of German reunification. German reunification 
took place on October 3, 1990, when the former German Democratic Republic 
was integrated into the Federal Republic of Germany. As a consequence of 
reunification, market size had a marked effect on both the supply and demand 
side from 1990 onward and, as Table 1 demonstrates, this is reflected in the 
high number of all store types in 1995 compared with 1990. 
Table 1:  Number of Establishments at the Store-type Levela) 
Year 
Hypermarkets/ 
Consumer 
Markets Discounters Supermarkets
Remaining 
Food 
Stores 
1980 1,314 - 5,190 69,763 
1985 1,513 - 9,845 58,015 
1990 1,656 - 7,817 50,888 
1995 2,038 10,630 9,635 54,100 
2000 2,363 12,770 9,230 45,900 
2003 2,494 13,750 8,790 39,900 
2004 2,558 14,214 8,620 37,350 
a) Excludes online shops and non-organised food retailing. After 1991, stores in the 
former German Democratic Republic are included, and discounters are shown 
separately. Remaining food stores contain discounters until 1990. 
Source: EHI (various years). 
There are clear trends in the number and shares of store types before and after 
reunification. The number of stores in the categories hypermarkets/consumer 
markets and discounters increased, whereas the proportions of remaining food 
stores and supermarkets declined. This characterises two major developments 
in German food retailing: (i) the move towards store types with a bigger sales 
area, and (ii) the boom in discounters. 
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With regard to increasing sales area, the number of hypermarkets and 
consumer markets rose continuously from 1,314 in 1980 to 2,558 in 2004. More 
supermarkets existed in 2004 (8,620) than in 1980 (5,190), too. Table 1 reveals, 
however, that their number declined after Germany was reunited, and this trend 
had already begun in former West Germany between 1985 and 1990. The 
number of remaining food stores, which are smaller than supermarkets, 
dropped from a high level of nearly 70,000 stores (1980) to about 37,000 (2004) 
due to structural change. The downward trend was only interrupted by a peak in 
1995 after reunification. 
In terms of the number of outlets, discounters are the store type that dominates 
German food retailing. 14,214 stores of this type existed in 2004; the number of 
discount stores has grown continuously and their share of all food stores even 
more so. However, the impressive growth of discounters slowed down at the 
beginning of the new millennium. 
As a study by the Coca-Cola Retailing Research Council Europe (CCRRCE) 
also points out “the rise of discounters does not, however, herald the end to the 
supermarket and hypermarket formats. […] the discount model is optimized for 
German shopper preferences. In other markets, the model’s advantages are 
significantly neutralized by a lack of shopper interest” (CCRRCE 2005, p. 12). 
Particularly in Germany, retailing companies have attracted bargain-pursuing 
customers (Koch/Friese 2005). German customers are highly focused on price, 
as an analysis of the Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (GfK) documented.  
It is interesting to note that the distribution of revenue across store types has 
changed substantially during the last 25 years. The group of remaining food 
stores, which have less than 400 square metres of sales area, accounted for 
nearly half of total revenue in food retailing in 1980. They were followed by 
supermarkets as well as hypermarkets and consumer markets. Supermarkets 
accounted for 35% of the industry’s total revenue. The largest store types had a 
market share of 20%. Over time, supermarkets and the remaining food stores 
have continuously lost market share to hypermarkets and consumer markets, 
and certainly to discounters. 
Figure 1 illustrates the real total revenue achieved by different store types over 
time. Supermarkets had been able to increase their total revenues from 27.3 
billion euros in 1980 to 32.2 billion euros in 1995. In the following years 
revenues decreased to 28.3 and 27.0 billion euros in 2000 and 2003 
respectively. As a consequence of the steady decline in the number of the 
remaining food stores, their total revenues also decreased.  
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In contrast, the hypermarkets and consumer markets displayed an impressive 
development in revenue terms. Their total revenue nearly doubled in the 
observation period. Finally, the group of discounters had the highest total 
revenue, and a positive trend can still be seen. In 2003, this store type 
accounted for 42.6 billion euros. 
It is interesting to note that the distribution of revenue across store types has 
changed substantially during the last 25 years. The group of remaining food 
stores, which have less than 400 square metres of sales area, accounted for 
nearly half of total revenue in food retailing in 1980. They were followed by 
supermarkets as well as hypermarkets and consumer markets. Supermarkets 
accounted for 35% of the industry’s total revenue. The largest store types had a 
market share of 20%. Over time, supermarkets and the remaining food stores 
have continuously lost market share to hypermarkets and consumer markets, 
and certainly to discounters.  
Figure 1: Real Total Revenue and Market Share at Store-type Levela) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Excludes online shops and non-organised food retailing. After 1991, stores in the 
new Federal States of the former German Democratic Republic are included, and 
discounters are shown separately. Remaining food stores include discounters until 
1990. 
Source: EHI (various years). 
As Figure 1 reveals, even the hypermarkets and consumer markets were not 
able to keep up with the increasing prominence of discounters in influencing 
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consumers’ buying behaviour in Germany. They have lost ground to discounters 
since 1990, and their market share has declined from 27.8% to 25.4% 
The discounters’ market share was nearly 40% in 2005, with Aldi accounting for 
42% of this figure, followed by Lidl. The market leader Aldi achieved nearly 
complete market penetration. It is indicative of discounters’ importance that 
about 87% of all German households, or 70 million of all consumers in 
Germany, can reach a store of Aldi or Lidl within 15 minutes (Twardawa 2006, 
p. 381). 
In a comparison of the two dominant firms, in 2003 Aldi’s revenue was 22 billion 
euros compared with Lidl’s 9.8 billion euros. Lidl, however, is much more 
aggressive in pursuing international expansion (CCRRCE 2005). As the 
CCRRCE study shows, it generated 48% of its total revenue from operations 
outside Germany (CCRRCE 2005, p. 10). The important foreign investment 
activities of German retailers, not only of discounters, are surveyed in more 
detail in Section 3. 
2.2 Changes at the Industry Level 
Four decades ago, German food retailing was dominated by a multitude of 
small retail outlets. These small stores were mainly service-oriented. The 
change from service-oriented stores to a self-service system has induced some 
sustainable changes in the industry. Above all, as Table 2 shows, the total 
number of retail establishments dropped from about 92,000 in 1980 to 67,000 in 
1990. The statistical peak in 1995 captures for the first time the food-retailing 
sector in the former German Democratic Republic. At that time, quite small 
stores were characteristic of food retailing in East Germany. After 1995, the 
number of food-retailing stores declined again sharply and continuously to 
55,300 in 2003.  
The fall in the number of stores was accompanied by an impressive increase in 
the total sales area from 16.1 million square metres in 1980 to 26.8 million in 
2003. The general rise in sales area was a crucial factor contributing to greater 
competition in the German food-retailing sector. The two components, i.e. fewer 
stores and a rising overall sales area, gave rise to even higher expansion of the 
average sales area per store. Whereas the average shop had a mean sales 
area of 176 square metres in 1980, this figure changed to 485 square metres in 
2003. This increase can be ascribed mainly to the appearance of new retail 
formats such as hypermarkets. 
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Table 2: The Development of the German Food-retailing Industrya) 
Total Revenue  
(Mill. Euros)b) 
Number of 
Employees 
Sales Area  
(1,000 m2) 
Year 
Number of 
Establish-
ments Total 
Per 
Establish-
ment 
Total
(1,000)
Per 
Establis-
hment 
Total 
Per 
Establish-
ment 
1980 91,600 80,005 0.873 408.4 4.5 16,100 0.176 
1985 77,000 77,459 1.006 414.0 5.4 17,600 0.228 
1990 67,000 85,811 1.281 422.2 6.3 19,400 0.290 
1995 74,300 97,800 1.317 425.2 5.7 23,800 0.321 
2000 60,025 91,459 1.425 358.0 5.6 25,900 0.404 
2003 55,300 90,396 1.636 365.3 6.6 26,800 0.485 
a) Excludes Aldi. After 1991, the new Federal States of the former German Democratic 
Republic are included. – b) Real values are computed with the consumer price index 
and the base year 1995 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006a). 
Source: A.C. Nielsen (various years). 
Other changes shown in Table 2 are related to revenue and employment. 
Neither the trend of total revenue nor the trend of the total number of employees 
has been uniform over the last 25 years. The decline in total revenue between 
1995 and 2003 indicates, however, that a certain level of saturation occurred in 
the aggregate food-retailing sector. Within this period, the number of employees 
also dropped. The rising number of employees per store in that period is a 
consequence of the enormous expansion of average store size. The continuous 
rise of revenue per store from 0.873 million euros in 1980 to 1.636 million euros 
in 2003 is striking. It represents stark productivity gains in the German food-
retailing sector. 
These structural changes induced an intensifying market concentration among 
the leading food-retailing companies which is illustrated in Figure 2. The share 
of the top twenty companies in total industry revenue was 81% in 1992. In 2004, 
the top twenty already accounted for 95.1%. The five leading companies earned 
half of the industry’s total revenue in 1992. They further strengthened their 
market position in the following twelve years and earned nearly two-thirds of the 
industry’s total revenue in 2004. 
As Figure 2  shows, the German retailing industry is characterised not only by a 
declining number of stores, but by the lower number being distributed over 
fewer companies. The individual companies’ revenue shares are presented in 
Table 3. The leading company in Germany’s food retailing industry is still Metro, 
which, however, lost some of its market share (-3.7 percentage points) to other 
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competitors in the observation period. Tengelmann and Tegut lost market 
share, too, but only by 1.7 and 0.1 percentage points respectively. All other 
companies were able to maintain or expand their market share.  
Figure 2: Market Share of the Leading Companies in German Food 
Retailing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: LZ (various years). 
It is striking that most of the companies raised their market share in the period 
up to 2000 and then some of these gains subsequently vanished. Edeka, Aldi, 
Schwarz, and Norma were in a position to withstand that negative industry 
trend. Three of these companies have their main business domain in 
discounting and Edeka operates some discount stores as well as other store 
types. In particular Schwarz, the owner of the discounter Lidl, more than 
doubled its market share in terms of total revenue within ten years and 
produced the highest growth rate.  
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Table 3: Companies' Market Share in German Food Retailing (in % of 
Total Revenue) 
 1994 1997 2000 2004 
Metro 18.6 19.3 16.2 14.9 
Rewe 13.1 13.6 14.6 14.2 
Edeka/AVA 11.6 12.7 12.6 13.4 
Aldia) 9.4 9.9 10.0 10.1 
Schwarza) 4.6 5.6 6.4 9.8 
Tengelmann 7.5 7.6 7.1 6.0 
Spar AGa) 4.3 5.6 4.0 4.0 
Globus 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.6 
Wal-Mart (Germany)a), b) - 0.7 1.5 1.3 
Normaa) 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 
Coop Schleswig-Holstein 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 
Tegut 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 
 a) Estimated. – b) Until 1998 Wertkauf Karlsruhe. 
Source: LZ (various years). 
Nevertheless, Aldi is the leading company among the discounters. In 2005, its 
industry market share was 16.9%, while the remaining discounters together had 
only 23.0% of the industry market share (A.C. Nielsen 2005). As Table 3 also 
indicates, Aldi generates only a small growth rate, and this may be due to the 
fact that Aldi has already attained almost complete market penetration (see 
Section 2.1). In contrast, Lidl, as the number two among the leading 
discounters, still has potential for growth. 
A further feature of Germany’s food-retailing industry is the relative absence of 
foreign food-retailing companies. The only companies which operated on the 
German market or tried to break into it are Wal-Mart, Delhaize
4
 and ITM 
Enterprises
5
. On entering the German food-retailing market, Wal-Mart absorbed 
                                            
4
  Delhaize is a Belgian company which offers its customers high-quality products. 
Foreign specialities and an innovative ambiance are characteristic of its stores.  
5
  His company is organised as a cooperative, and it joined the German Spar 
cooperative. After making losses for years, ITM Enterprises withdrew from the 
German market. 
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the retailing companies Wertkauf and Eurospar. However, Wal-Mart did not 
succeed in becoming a major player, as its market share of only 1.3 percent in 
2004 indicates. It ranked ninth among the leading food-retailing companies in 
Germany in that year. Since Wal-Mart was not able to transfer its worldwide 
successful business concept to the German market, its performance in terms of 
earnings and market share was disappointing, and well below its own ambitious 
goals. In the end, Wal-Mart withdrew from the German market after eight and a 
half years of business. The retailing outlets were taken over by Metro, 
Germany’s leading food-retailing company. 
This failure of Wal-Mart to enter the German food-retailing market can be 
ascribed to imperfect adjustment to the German market and very low margins 
(Fernie et al. 2006; Hurth 2003). In the German industry, returns on sales in 
food-retailing typically vary between 0.5% and 2%, whereas in Great Britain, for 
example, they range from 5% to 7% (Koch/Friese 2005).  
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3 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
As outlined in Section 2, the German food-retailing sector is dominated by a 
relatively small number of companies, which are facing robust price competition 
and comparatively low retail margins. This situation is an outcome of excess 
capacity: in Germany, there are 250 food-retailing stores with a sales area of 
more than 400 square meters for every one million inhabitants. For comparison, 
in Great Britain the ratio is only 110 stores and in France 120 shops to one 
million inhabitants (Koch/Friese 2005). 
In order to compensate for this difficult domestic market, German retailing 
companies have strengthened their international expansion activities. The real 
foreign direct investment (FDI) of German companies is presented in Table 4 as 
an indicator of this strategy. The first grey-shaded row describes the real direct 
and indirect investments of all German industries in the foreign retailing sector. 
It is apparent that the real outward FDI has increased steadily – from all 
industries to retailing, from the retailing sector to all industries, and from retailing 
to retailing. 
Table 4: Real German Direct and Indirect Foreign Investment (Bill. 
Euros)a), b), c) 
From Industry To Industry 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
All Retailing 18.84 25.62 29.33 60.34 66.65
 of which (in %)      
  EU (25) 43.4 51.8 57.1 52.4 59.1 
  United States 27.5 21.1 18.1 21.7 17.3 
Retailing All 3.80 6.10 6.33 9.52 8.93
 of which (in %)      
  EU (25) 27.9 42.0 59.3 52.1 75.9 
  United States 40.8 32.2 16.2 19.0 8.7 
Retailing Retailing  - 4.16 4.89 6.58 6.94
 of which (in %)      
  EU (25) - 38.8 63.3 57.8 81.1 
  United States - 39.3 25.3 17.7 7.5 
a) Including maintenance and repair of vehicles and consumer goods since 1995. – b) 
In 1993 and 2002 the reporting limit of total assets' investment objects rose from 0.26 
to 0.5 mill. euros and from 0.5 to 3 mill. euros respectively. – c) Real values computed 
with the GDP deflator and the base year 1991 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006b). 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (various years) and own computations. 
In 1985, German companies invested 18.8 billion euros in retailing abroad and, 
by 2004, the figure had risen by about 250% to 66.7 billion euros. Although the 
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growth rates of real outward FDI undertaken by German retailers were lower 
than for the total of German companies, they were still substantial. Retailers’ 
FDI more than doubled from 1985 to 2004, indicating of course the effect of 
German unification on market size. Growth rates of intra-retailing FDI were 
below average, but even these were considerable compared with the growth of 
the food trade in the same period. It can be shown that the retailing industry 
had, and still has, an inclination to invest in the same industry. About 68% of the 
retailing industries’ FDI in 1990, and 78% in 2004, went to the retailing sector 
abroad. In other words, the retailing industry concentrated its foreign activities 
on its core competence – retailing.  
Only two geographical regions are of major interest as destinations of this major 
increase in outward FDI, namely the European Union and the United States. 
Investment inside the EU always outperformed FDI to the US, and the latter 
steadily lost ground. In 2004 (1985), 17.3 (27.5)% of all investments took place 
in US retailing companies, whereas 59.1 (43.4)% of all FDI flows went to EU 
retailing companies. The concentration on the EU becomes even more 
important if only the retailing industry’s investment is analysed. The United 
States’ investment share dropped by 31.8 percentage points from 39.3% in 
1990 to 7.5% in 2004. 
The increasing prominence of European retailing companies as strategic 
investments can be partly explained by the opening up of Eastern European 
countries. Former socialist countries like Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary opened up their markets and they developed a more market-oriented 
economic policy and thus became more attractive for foreign companies. Lower 
input prices for labour, real estate and energy, as well as affordable commodity 
prices, favoured a location in Eastern Europe. The closeness to the home 
market and a company’s headquarters – Germany – will certainly have had a 
positive impact, too. 
Not only do German companies invest in retailing industries in foreign countries 
but also foreign companies have been attracted by the German market and the 
retailing industry in Germany. But, as was pointed out in Section 2.2, the 
German market has its own special characteristics, like market concentration, 
low retail margins, the prominence of discounters, and discriminating 
consumers. These characteristics make entrepreneurial activity in German food 
retailing challenging. Most of the FDI inflows have not resulted in direct control 
of target companies, as the spectacular and widely discussed failures of foreign 
companies entering the German market document (see the case of Wal-Mart). 
FDI inflows steadily increased, as did the FDI outflows. In 1985, foreign 
companies invested 9.5 billion euros in the German retailing industry, and the 
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real total FDI increased by nearly 300% to 36.7 billion euros in 2004. This was 
accompanied by a change in the proportions of FDI inflows from different 
regions. In 1985, three sources were of importance – the EU, the United States 
and Japan. Intra-EU investments became more important over time, as the 
increase by 25 percentage points indicates. This occurred at the expense of 
Japanese and American companies whose shares of FDI inflows to Germany 
diminished. 
Table 5: Real Foreign Investment in German Food Retailing (Bill. 
Euros)a), b), c) 
From 
Industry/Country To Industry 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
All Retailing 9.458 18.119 23.545 32.790 36.716
of which (in %)    
 EU 32.6 38.7 45.2 52.7 57.6 
 Belgium - 2.2 1.6 1.9 0.3 
 Denmark - 1.4 2.3 2.9 2.2 
 France 10.5 9.2 8.7 8.2 7.5 
 Italy - 3.7 2.6 1.6 1.6 
 Luxembourg - - 0.9 1.6 3.6 
 Netherlands 7.7 13.5 15.0 22.3 18.9 
 Austria - 1.5 2.1 2.2 1.9 
 Sweden - 2.1 2.4 1.6 1.0 
 Spain - - - - 1.9 
 United Kingdom 5.8 6.6 6.9 7.9 14.6 
 Switzerland 10.5 12.6 9.1 7.3 5.3 
 United States 17.1 16.3 15.4 15.9 12.2 
 Japan 
 
21.4 21.5 18.8 15.1 15.9 
a) Includes maintenance and repair of vehicles and consumer goods since 1995. - b) In 
1993 and 2002 the reporting limit of total assets' investment objects rose from 0.26 to 
0.5 mill. euros and from 0.5 to 3 mill. euros respectively. - c) Real values computed 
with the GDP deflator and the base year 1991 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006b). 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (various years) and own computations. 
Within the EU, the countries of origin’s relative importance of inward FDI also 
changed. Countries like the United Kingdom (+8.8 percentage points), and to a 
lesser extent Luxembourg, Denmark and Austria, strengthened their share of 
total investment in German retailing. Dutch companies increased their share of 
FDI inflows until 2000 by 14.6 percentage points, but their share decreased 
again after 2000 from a high level of 22.3%. The Netherlands are still the most 
important single-country investor in German retailing. On the other hand, 
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countries like Belgium, Italy and Sweden became less significant, and the 
decline of Switzerland and France in the German FDI market was even greater. 
A comparison of the real total FDI inflows and outflows of all German industries 
to the retailing sector is presented in Figure 3. FDI outflows exceeded FDI 
inflows at all times. Real net FDI outflows grew over time. Three stages of FDI 
outflows can be identified. The first wave was in the period 1982-1984, with a 
quite small increase in FDI.  
Figure 3: German Real FDI Outflows and Inflows to the Retailing 
Sectora), b), c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Includes maintenance and repair of vehicles and consumer goods since 1995. - b) In 1993 
and 2002, the reporting limit of total assets' investment objects rose from 0.26 to 0.5 mill. euros 
and from 0.5 to 3 mill. euros respectively. - c) Real values computed with the GDP deflator and 
the base year 1991 (Statistisches Bundesamt  2006b). 
 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (various years). 
 
The second wave (1987-1989) was also small but, in contrast, the third stage 
(1995-2001) had the highest rate of growth and increased the divergence 
between FDI inflows and outflows. Only two stages are clearly visible in the 
development of FDI inflows - one in the period 1988-1991 and the other in the 
period 1998-2001. Only in the period 1988-1991 did FDI inflows correspond to 
the expenditure of German industries on foreign retailing companies. Not only 
did the second stage of FDI inflows begin four years later than the third wave of 
FDI outflows but its growth rate was also lower. 
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4 MARKET CONDUCT IN GERMAN FOOD RETAILING: 
RETAILERS’ PRICING STRATEGIES 
Strong market concentration has taken place in the German food-retailing 
sector, as was shown in Section 2. Market structure, however, does not 
necessarily determine retailers’ behaviour and, thus, market conduct. Under an 
oligopolistic market structure, for example, price formation can be similar to a 
competitive situation when some powerful retailers choose an aggressive low-
price strategy. This may well be the case for Germany where the market share 
of discounters is higher than in other industrialised countries. 
Given this background and the fact that scanner data have been available for at 
least a decade in Germany, we deal with market conduct in terms of food 
pricing in this section. In Section 4.1, the overall level of food prices in Germany 
is analysed and compared with that in other countries.  Based on the existing 
literature and a broad sample of foods, Section 4.2 seeks to determine the 
pricing behaviour of German grocery retailers. In Section 4.3, we present a case 
study for coffee which captures empirical evidence of market conduct in 
German grocery retailing. EDLP and HiLo strategies, retail sales campaigns, 
price stickiness, psychological pricing points, and the importance of national 
brands versus private labels are covered. Section 4.4 presents a brief review of 
studies of market power in the German food economy. 
4.1 The Price Level in German Food Retailing 
There is ample evidence that the law of one price does not hold in the German 
food-retailing sector. Buschle (1997) analyses interregional price differences of 
processed food products with scanner data across several urban areas in 
Germany. She finds a lower price level in the Northern part of Germany and a 
higher price level in Berlin, Stuttgart and metropolitan areas along the river 
Rhine. Price differences between various store types and retailing firms are 
analysed by Möser (2002), and she finds no evidence of the law of one price, 
either. 
One remarkable result is that food prices grew at a noticeably lower rate in 
Germany than in other EU countries. Over the last ten years, consumer prices 
for food and non-alcoholic beverages in Germany increased in real terms, but 
much less than in many other European countries. This is certainly due to the 
major role of discounters in German food retailing. Figure 4 shows the 
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development of the harmonised consumer price index6 for food and non-
alcoholic beverages as an annual average index for different European 
countries. 
Figure 4: Harmonised Consumer Price Index for Food and Non-
alcoholic Beverages for Different European Countries, 1996 – 
2005a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) European Union: EC12-94, EC15-04, EU25; Germany: after 1991 includes former German 
Democratic Republic. 
Source: Own computations using EUROSTAT-Database (2006).  
Some evidence has been presented in the last few years to show how special 
events like the introduction of the euro affected consumer prices in general and 
food prices in particular. The implementation of a single European currency in 
January 2002 has been a focus of attention by the public, the media and 
academics. It has given rise to an important debate about firms’ pricing 
strategies and the measurement of inflation. European statistical offices and 
central banks argued that the introduction of the euro did not induce an extra 
degree of inflation. This statement is based on a comparison of consumer price 
indexes in the periods before and after the introduction of the euro. Compared 
                                            
6
 The Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) is an indicator of inflation and price stability used by 
the European Central Bank (ECB). It is a weighted average of price indices of member states in 
order to show how the consumer price index develops for the entire Euro Zone (Diewert 2002).  
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with a two-and-a-half year period prior to the implementation of the euro, the 
rise in German prices for food and non-alcoholic beverages decreased from 
4.3% to 3.3% after the introduction of the euro (Brachinger 2005). The number 
of price adjustments peaked in the first month of the year 2002 due to the new 
currency but, as Statistisches Bundesamt (2002) argued, this process 
normalised in the following months. The number of nine-ending prices in 
retailing declined significantly, because most prices were translated correctly 
into the new currency (Deutsche Bundesbank 2002; Diller/Brambach 2002). 
The low statistical price increase after the introduction of the euro was not 
consistent with the substantially higher inflation perceived by the population. 
Consumers realised that retailers had already raised prices in 2001 prior to the 
introduction of the euro, in particular for goods with a high frequency of 
purchase like foods. Figure 5 illustrates, too, that the consumer price index rose 
significantly in 2001 for all categories of food and beverages except coffee, 
cocoa and tea. Recent studies with a statistical index of perceived inflation 
indicate that perceived inflation and CPI-based inflation deviated greatly in the 
years 2001 and 2002 around the time when the euro was introduced 
(Brachinger 2005). Apparently, retailers had raised prices in advance in order to 
correct them downwards later to “attractive” euro prices below new pricing 
points. 
Figure 5: Harmonised Consumer Price Index for Different Food Groups 
in Germany, 1996 – 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own computations with EUROSTAT-Database (2006).  
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Differently from food prices, the measurement of actual and perceived prices 
shows uniform results in other sectors of the economy. In the case of 
restaurants, for example,  not only were menu costs attributable to the 
introduction of the euro passed on but the opportunity was used to raise prices 
by a substantially higher amount (Hobijn/Ravenna/Tanbalotti 2006; Nierhaus 
2002). 
4.2 Pricing Strategies of German Food Retailers: General Patterns 
The pricing strategies employed by German grocery-retailing firms are 
characterised by widespread retail sales campaigns for branded foods, a 
substantial degree of price rigidity and the existence of psychological pricing 
points. Additionally, private labels play an important role in the price-setting 
behaviour of most retailing firms. In this section, we survey these phenomena in 
respect of a broader sample of food products and in the next section we add 
empirical evidence for one product group, namely coffee. 
Sales are obviously an essential part of retailers’ marketing strategies. Hosken 
and Reiffen (2001) define a sale as a “temporary reduction in the price of an 
item that is unrelated to cost changes”. Selected national brands are often used 
for sales promotions in order to attract consumers to relevant stores. With the 
HiLo strategies of food retailers in particular, brands are put on special offer 
periodically, and this raises price variability. In the case of quite a large number 
of national food brands, quantitative studies have revealed that the price 
elasticity of demand at the point of sale is above unity in absolute terms 
(Schäfer 1997; Möser 2002). Thus, price campaigns typically lead to an 
increase in retailers’ earnings for the promoted brands (Hansen 2006). It has 
also been demonstrated that food retailers either have more special offers with 
lower price discounts or fewer special offers with higher price discounts. In a 
case study for butter, Hansen (2006) produced evidence that the level of the 
price discount is time-dependent too and rises, for example, prior to holidays. 
Möser (2002) and Herrmann, Möser and Weber (2005) show with a 
commercially available scanner dataset7 that sales promotions for branded 
foods are widespread in Germany. Using the scanner dataset, the number of 
                                            
7
 This scanner dataset captures scanner data from the German food-retailing sector for 144 weeks, i.e. 
the period from September 30, 1996, to June 28, 1999. Four types of retailing firm were selected for this 
study (i) large consumer markets (1,500 to 5,000 m2 sales area); (ii) small consumer markets (800 to 
1,499 m2); (iii) supermarkets (400 to 799 m2) and (iv) discounters. The empirical evidence is provided at 
the level of six grocery-retailing firms. 
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price campaigns was counted for 20 national processed food products, which 
are well-known brands in Germany. A price campaign was defined as a 
situation in which the brand was priced at least 5% below the normal price. 
Table 6 illustrates that, in the case of the six grocery-retailing firms, the number 
of price campaigns per store varies widely. Firms’ promotion activities are very 
heterogeneous. A crucial factor is whether firms apply an EDLP or a HiLo 
strategy. Whereas the median number of price campaigns per store is as high 
as 9.6 for Firm C, the corresponding values are much smaller for Firm E (1.3). 
Not surprisingly, the brands differ substantially with regard to the frequency they 
are put into a price campaign. There is a peak value of 31 price campaigns per 
store within the 144-week period, whereas other brands do not feature in the 
promotion strategies of individual firms at all.  
Table 6: Summary of Pricing Strategies of German Food Retailers,  
20 Brands, Weekly Prices, 1996-99a) 
German Food Retailers Indicators of Pricing 
Strategy 
Statistical 
Measure 
A B C D E F 
Median 
Sales Median 1.7 8.9 9.6 2.6 1.3 5.1 3.9 b) 
Price 
Rigidity Median 35.8 8.8 7.3 26.3 44.3 11.9 19.1 
b) 
Median of 
PSYCH 98.5 95.0 90.9 96.0 99.2 96.6 96.3 
b) Psycho-
logical 
Prices Median of 
CR2 91.1 66.1 79.8 83.1 98.3 61.2 81.5 
b) 
a) The sample period and the included stores are explained in Footnote 7. The number 
of observations differs across the grocery-retailing firms and products. – b) Median of 
the medians, computed across firms. 
Source: Herrmann/Möser/Weber (2005). 
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A further finding is that the importance of the sale phenomenon is strongly 
dependent on the store type and, as illustrated by Table 7, it is most important 
in large consumer markets, small consumer markets and supermarkets. The 
median value of price campaigns per store is 7.5 for large consumer markets, 
but only 1.0 for discounters. 
Table 7:  Summary of Pricing Strategies of Four German Store Types,  
20 Brands, Weekly Prices, 1996-99a) 
German Store Types Indicators 
of Pricing 
Strategy 
Statistical 
Measure Dis-counters 
Super-
markets 
Small 
Consumer 
Markets 
Large 
Consumer 
Markets 
Median 
Sales Median 1.0 5.1 6.0 7.5 5.6b) 
Price 
Rigidity Median 37.5 13.2 11.1 9.0 12.2
b) 
Median of 
PSYCH 96.4 92.6 93.2 91.2 92.9 Psycho-logical 
Prices Median of CR2 85.3 66.1 68.3 69.4 68.9 
a) The sample period and the included stores are explained in Footnote 7. The number 
of observations differs across the store types and products. – b) Median of the 
medians, computed across store types.  
Source: Herrmann/Möser/Weber (2005). 
It can be seen that promotional campaigns influence the dynamic pricing 
pattern, which is characterised by price instability or price rigidity. Price rigidity 
(PRIG) is measured as the mean duration of unchanged prices, following 
Powers and Powers (2001):  
PCHw/wPRIG = , (1) 
where w stands for the number of weeks with price observations, and wPCH is 
the number of weeks with price changes. Besides indicators of cost or demand 
transmission, the mean duration of unchanged prices is typically regarded as 
one major element of price stickiness.  
The data on the price rigidity implemented by grocery-retailing firms in Germany 
are summarised in Table 6. The results reveal that firms’ strategies again play 
an important role. Whereas median price rigidity is as high as 44.3 weeks in 
Firm E, median price rigidity in Firm C reaches “only” 7.3 weeks. In Firm E, 
peak values between 139 and 134 weeks for three brands indicate that prices 
are adjusted in some cases only very rarely, i.e. less than every two years. On 
the other hand, the median of unchanged prices for major brands like Dallmayr 
Prodomo, Rama and Nutella ranges between 2.7 and 3.9 weeks in Firm B. It is 
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apparent that prices are adjusted much more actively for some brands and in 
some firms. 
Price rigidity also varies widely across store types. Discounters, a store type 
with a very clear every-day-low-price (EDLP) strategy, have by far the highest 
price rigidity: the median of periods of unchanged prices is as high as 37.5 
weeks, well above supermarkets (13.2 weeks), small consumer markets (11.1 
weeks) and large consumer markets (9.0 weeks). The differences between 
store types are very interesting, as they suggest that discounters in Germany 
tend to stabilise consumer prices, an effect that is getting stronger due to 
discounters’ rising market share. It is striking that the ranking of store types 
according to price rigidity is exactly opposite to the ranking in respect of price 
campaigns: discounters practised the highest level of price rigidity and had the 
lowest level of price campaigns per store. Large consumer markets practised 
the lowest price rigidity, but had the highest number of price campaigns per 
store. They are at the upper and lower end of a scale characterising EDLP 
versus HiLo pricing strategies.  
With the help of monthly price records from national statistical offices, Dhyne et 
al. (2006) show that, compared with other European countries and the United 
States, price changes in Germany for processed and unprocessed foods are 
less frequent. They point out that the structure of the distribution sector plays an 
important role in many countries and suggest that the frequency of price 
changes is higher in countries where large outlets are predominant. However, 
Germany is characterised by a high proportion of large outlets and by relatively 
high price rigidity, again suggesting that discounters are largely responsible for 
the price stickiness measured. 
Loy and Weiss (2004) refer to price rigidities and synchronisation of prices in 
German retail stores and demonstrate that very often prices were synchronised 
between the different stores of German food retailers and between products. 
They find that only some cases of synchronisation can be explained by common 
shocks, such as a shift in world commodity prices, suggesting that strategic 
goals and chain-specific menu costs are important.  
Psychological pricing points have been suggested by economists as well as 
psychologists as a rationale for sticky prices (see for example Blinder et al. 
1998, Stiving/Winter 1997). However, psychological reasons for “odd pricing”, 
“just-below-the-round-figure pricing” or “psychological pricing” have been 
stressed as being important more in the marketing than in the economics 
literature. In the overview in Tables 6 and 7, we use two different measures for 
psychological pricing strategies: PSYCH refers to the percentage share of 
important psychological prices, i.e. those which are set in at least 5% of all 
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cases, in all observed prices. Additionally, concentration ratios for the two most 
important psychological prices CR2 are provided for the six grocery-retailing 
firms and for the store types.  
PSYCH can be interpreted as a measure of the overall importance of 
psychological prices. A high value of PSYCH may be compatible with the 
economic and the psychological hypotheses of psychological pricing. We argue 
that CR2 yields valuable additional information. It is CR2 rather than PSYCH 
which measures the economic presumption that psychological price barriers are 
valid. If CR2 is large, this suggests that retailers will expect a strong reaction by 
consumers if a psychological price barrier is exceeded. Therefore, they will only 
rarely move beyond that barrier.  
Also, PSYCH is likely to be much higher than CR2. More prices, in some cases 
many more psychological prices, are then set by retailers. In this case, retailers’ 
pricing strategies are likely to be quite flexible and not limited by major 
psychological pricing points and, despite relatively frequent price changes, 9-
ending or 99-ending effects do occur since customers either round down prices 
or apply a left-to-right comparison. This constellation implies that psychological 
prices are then part of a pricing strategy in which firms move from one 
psychological price to the next. Major price barriers, as indicated by Sweezy’s 
kinked demand function, cannot explain this kind of pricing strategy. It is rather 
the level effects explained in cognitive psychology that seem to be crucial for 
this type of observed behaviour. 
We deduce from Table 6 and Table 7 that psychological prices are the rule 
rather than the exception in German grocery retailing and that the two most 
important psychological prices cover a large proportion of the prices 
investigated. Median values across brands are for all firms above 90%, with 
Firm E being extreme: in Firm E, the median of PSYCH is 99.2%. Almost all 
prices are psychological prices. According to Table 6, the concentration ratios 
for the two most important psychological prices are also high for all grocery-
retailing firms. Medians range between 61.2% and 98.3%. 
Table 7 shows that across stores PSYCH is higher than 90% for all individual 
store types, when medians across the brands are calculated. Psychological 
pricing is even more widespread in discounters than in the other three store 
types, with an impressive median value of 96.4%. The variation of CR2, 
however, across store types is much higher than for PSYCH. Median values for 
CR2 across brands are in the range between 66.1% and 69.4% for 
supermarkets, small consumer markets and large consumer markets, and 
clearly higher for discounters at 85.3%. 
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How the variables discussed are interrelated has been analysed within 
structural econometric models by Herrmann, Möser and Weber (2005). The 
general result is illustrated in Figure 6. It has been shown that store types and 
firms choose their individual price promotion and psychological pricing 
strategies. Price promotions are planned as a function of the price elasticity of 
demand for food brands, i.e. the number of promotions rises with the absolute 
value of the price elasticity. Psychological-pricing strategies are driven by the 
number of price promotions, too. Price rigidity in German grocery retailing is 
then a function of psychological-pricing and price-promotion strategies. 
Figure 6: Determinants of Price Rigidity in German Grocery Retailing 
Source: Own illustration. 
Private labels are widespread in the German retailing sector. These products 
are introduced as alternatives to national brands. Thus, they represent a crucial 
element in food retailers’ marketing and pricing strategies. Möser (2002) 
analyses the price levels of different private labels and national brands with 
scanner data and finds private labels in different price segments. Ecological 
private label products in particular are located in the high price segment. Jonas 
and Roosen (2006) use consumer panel scanner data for estimating price 
elasticities of ecological and conventional private labels and national brands of 
milk. Consistent with the marketing of ecological private label milk as a premium 
product, the price elasticity is very high, namely -2.502.  
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4.3 Pricing Strategies of German Food Retailers: A Case Study for Coffee 
After this more general overview of pricing strategies in the German retailing 
sector, a case study for coffee follows. In Germany, coffee is a typical loss-
leader product for different retailing firms which is intensively advertised and 
frequently sold on special offer. Furthermore, the high variation in coffee input 
prices leads to frequent price adjustments by the retailing sector (Möser 2002). 
In her detailed study of the German coffee market, Körner (2004) identifies 
intensive price competition for coffee in the retailing sector. 
The pricing strategies of six grocery-retailing firms were analysed in the case of 
five national coffee brands, which are well-known in Germany, and a private 
label coffee brand that is distributed only by two grocery-retailing firms. Highly 
aggregated indicators of price rigidity (PRIG) and of the importance of 
psychological prices are given in Table 8 for the six grocery-retailing firms. The 
following main results can be derived:  
The data reveal that firms’ strategies play a significant role. Whereas median 
price rigidity is as high as 7.9 weeks in Firm D and 7.5 weeks in Firm E, median 
price rigidity in Firm B reaches “only” 2.6 weeks. Median price rigidity varies 
greatly across products, too. If we compute the median of the medians across 
brands, the mean duration of unchanged prices is 5.2 weeks. Price rigidity is 
much higher than 5.2 weeks for some brands (brands 1 and 6), but for other 
brands it is considerably lower: 2.0 weeks for brand 4, 3.5 weeks for brand 2, 
and 4.1 weeks for brand 3. 
A comparison with price rigidity for the 20 nationally distributed brands covered 
in Table 6 reveals that price instability is much higher in the coffee sector. The 
mean duration of unchanged prices across the six coffee brands is only 5.2 
weeks, but the mean duration for 20 processed products (which include also 
one coffee brand) is nearly 19 weeks.  
It can be deduced from Table 8 that psychological prices are the rule rather 
than the exception in German grocery retailing. Median values across brands 
are above 70% for all firms, with Firm E being extreme: in Firm E, the median of 
PSYCH is 93.4%. Almost all prices are psychological prices. Almost all prices 
are important psychological prices, too, because they cover 5% or more of all 
observed prices. Across the six grocery-retailing firms, PSYCH ranges between 
71.2% (brand 4) and 92.4% (brand 6). The median across the six brands is 
85.4%. 
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Table 8: Price Rigidity in Six German Grocery-Retailing Firms, Six 
Coffee Brands, Weekly Prices, 1996-99a) 
 PRIGb) 
Brands A B C D E F Median 
1 16.3 2.7 7.2 11.1 18.0 9.3 10.2 
2 2.9 2.1 2.9 5.6 6.3 4 3.5 
3 3.7 2.6 2.7 7.1 8.6 4.5 4.1 
4 1.7 2 2.6 1.9 2.1 1.9 2.0 
5 5.9 2.6 6.1 8.6 7.5 6.6 6.4 
6 - c) - c) 13.3 12.9 - c) - c) 13.1 
Median 3.7 2.6 4.5 7.9 7.5 4.5 4.5d)/5.2e)
PSYCHb) 
 Brands 
A B C D E F 
Median 
1 94.6 77.4 83.1 86.5 93.7 85.6 86.1 
2 73.7 70.6 74.3 85.9 84.4 81.9 78.1 
3 83.4 82.6 74.3 85.9 93.4 89.7 84.7 
4 64.7 70.4 95.0 67.3 71.9 72.7 71.2 
5 90.3 83.8 86.2 92.7 94.7 92.6 91.5 
6 - c) - c) 97.5 87.2 - c) - c) 92.4 
Median 83.4 77.4 84.7 86.2 93.4 85.6 85.4d)/ 
85.4e) 
a) The sample period and the included stores are explained Footnote 7. The number of 
observations differs across the grocery-retailing firms and products. – b) PRIG and PSYCH are 
defined in the text. – c) Not distributed in this grocery-retailing firm. – d) Median of the medians, 
computed across firms. – e) Median of the medians, computed across brands. 
Source: Möser/Herrmann (2006) and authors’ computations. 
It is interesting to note that it was not possible to confirm for the coffee sector 
taken in isolation the structural relationships detected in Figure 6 between price 
rigidity, price promotions, psychological prices and firms’ strategies. Most likely, 
this is due to the fact that price promotions affect the price rigidity of all major 
coffee brands. Offer prices for major coffee brands seem to be a crucial element 
in the promotional activities of all firms. Thus, there is not much variation of 
price rigidity across coffee brands whereas differences are substantial across 
food categories. 
Differential pricing strategies do exist, however, for private labels as opposed to 
national coffee brands. Möser (2002) shows that private labels are typically 
characterised by lower prices than national coffee brands, and also by a lower 
absolute and a higher relative marketing margin. But private labels differ in 
terms of price rigidity, too. 
Based on our scanner dataset, it can be shown that nearly 90% of the variation 
of price rigidity across coffee brands can be explained with a few major 
variables, namely psychological prices (PSYCH), the mean price level (PRICE), 
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whether a product is a private label (PRILABEL) and dummy variables for 
selected national brands (e.g. BRAND3, BRAND5). The following equation for 
the estimated price rigidity (EPRIG) includes only statistically significant 
coefficients: 
)32n**;*98.37F;86.0R(
)50.3()47.3()43.7(
**0918.5**4233.4***5353.25
)19.7()98.2()57.9(
***1444.8**1477.0***2905.81
2 ===
+++
−
++−=
BRAND5BRAND3PRILABEL
PRICEPSYCHEPRIG
 (2) 
*** stands for the 99.9% level, ** for the 99% level of statistical significance, t-
values are in parentheses. 
We can conclude from equation (2) that grocery retailers’ coffee prices are more 
rigid 
• the more psychological prices are set, 
• the higher the average coffee price, 
• for private labels than for the reference products of national brands, 
• for some national brands than for others, depending on their attractiveness for 
retail sales campaigns. 
Apart from these variables, the number of price promotions does not play a 
significant role. 
4.4 Market Power in the German Retailing Sector and Consequential 
Impacts 
Changes in market structure suggest increasing potential market power: as 
described in Section 2, concentration in the German retailing sector has 
increased sharply. Unfortunately, there are very few studies which have tested 
in structural models whether food retailers actually exerted oligopolistic or 
oligopsonistic market power on either consumers or the food-processing sector 
in Germany. Exceptions are analyses for the coffee, meat and banana sectors. 
Körner (2004) analyses the German coffee market with various methodological 
approaches, for example, by testing for market behaviour within a conjectural-
variation approach. One general result is that price and quality competition is 
strong, and there is no evidence of collusive behaviour. Thus, strong 
concentration at the retail level is combined with competitive market behaviour. 
In the case of the German banana market, Herrmann and Sexton (2002) test 
different hypotheses regarding the competitiveness of the market and analyse 
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how welfare implications of the European Banana Market Organization are 
affected by those hypotheses. They conclude that, despite the high 
concentration in the banana economy, the imperfect-competition hypothesis is 
not supported by the econometric results. Market conduct at the consumer level 
was most supportive of a small-country, perfect-competition model. 
Anders (2005) tests for market power in the retailing sector by analysing the 
meat marketing channel in Germany. Here, primary agricultural products – e.g. 
beef and pork - are produced by farmers and sold to meat processors. After 
processing and packaging, the meat products are sold by the retailing sector to 
consumers. The estimates
8
 of oligopsony and oligopoly retail market power 
reveal that perfect competition and price-taking behaviour can be rejected in the 
beef and pork market. As a result, the beef prices per kg decreased at farm 
level by nearly 0.40 euros from a hypothetical price of 3.34 euros under perfect 
competition to the actual price of 2.94 euros due to imperfect competition at the 
retail level.  
When we combine the empirical results in Section 4 with these results from 
market-power models, we can conclude that increasing concentration in 
German food retailing has not negatively affected consumers. The law of one 
price certainly does not hold, and retailers apply their own pricing strategies. But 
the increasing role of discounters, with their EDLP strategies, puts pressure on 
food prices and limits the oligopoly power that the large food retailers can exert 
over consumers. There is, however, a clear indication that some oligopsony 
market power by food retailers affects producers and processors, at least for 
individual product categories like meat. 
                                            
8
 For more details regarding the database and estimation procedures consult Anders (2005).  
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
Over the last four decades, the German food-retailing sector has been subject 
to continuous structural change. Most important has been the combination of 
increasing concentration with rising store size and the growing role of 
discounters implementing an aggressive EDLP pricing strategy. Thus, 
consumers have benefited from intensive price competition, despite the higher 
market share of leading food retailers. The analysis of market conduct, in terms 
of price formation and pricing strategies, reveals a typical situation of imperfect 
competition. The law of one price certainly does not hold for individual foods. 
Price levels and pricing strategies diverge substantially across firms and store 
types. There are successful retailers with an EDLP strategy, as well as others 
with a HiLo strategy. A major lesson to be learned from the German experience 
is that increasing concentration in food retailing does not necessarily imply that 
more market power is exerted at the expense of consumers. Competitive 
markets are compatible with a high level of concentration as long as a strong 
competitive fringe, for example discounters, challenges the large chains in food 
retailing. 
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